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7 A Marxist influence on 
Wittgenstein via Sraffa 
John B. Davis 
This chapter look at pos ible indirect influences of the Marxist tradition on the 
later ideas of Ludwig Wiugenstein via the comact between \\'ittgenstein and the 
Italian economist Piero raffa. Sraffa v:a influenced by t.he Italian ~larxist 
Anto nio Gramsci (Bharadwaj, l989; Ginzburg, I 998; r\aJdi, 2000), and though 
\Viugenstein's t.hinking has no apparent direct link to Grarnsci' , a case can be 
made for aying that ' raffa had an impact on Wiugen tein that ·pecifically 
reficCLcd Gram ci's influence on him. Tho ugh the evidence that Gram ci influ-
enced , ra1Ta is solid, and the evidence that ' rana influenced \Vittgen tein is 
equally tangible, intcrpret.ing these influence is subject to considerable cOim·o-
\'er ·y. Let me consequcmly begin by identifying the difficulties involved in 
making this argument, and t.hus sugge t the way in v.hich I a ttempt to make the 
argument in this chapter. 
It is first important to emphasise that, because the connections suggested here 
cross boundaries be tween very different types or thinking Grarnsci's ideas were 
about politics and the state, Sraffa's were about economics, and Willgcnstein's 
were about traditional philosophical topics - the argument for this particular 
channel of influence needs to be couched in terms of broad philosophical tradi-
tion in Europe in the first half of the twemieth century In this rc pect, I 
distingui h between certain continental European and Briti ·h traditions of idea , 
and argue that the pathway from Gramsci to \\'iugen tcin through ' raffa reflects 
an influence of the former on the latter. pecifically, the European influence was 
wirldcd thro ugh the thcoret.ical practice of critique the no tion that ideas must 
be evaluated in term of their historical role . This type of thinking stemmed 
from the H egelian tradition and ,,·as largely absent in the dominant t-\.9glophone 
approach to philo ophy of language bur, I argue, \\'as appljed to the latter by 
rafT a, and then by the later '\·iugenstein at least in some part on account of 
raffa's influence. Second, 1 emphasise that the focus in this chapter is only o n 
one possible in£luencc on \Vittgenstein's later ideas. I do not claim that Marxist 
or SrafTa's ideas were fully constitutive of Wittgenstein's later ideas or otherwise 
exhaust their meaning nnd importance. Third, a last caveat concerns this 
chapter's approach. Because the acknowledged and direct connections between 
Gramsci a nd raffa and between Sraffa and Wittgenstcin arc few and contro\'er-
. ial, my argument doe not proceed so much by analysing; a pattern of influence, 
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but rather by identifying shared positions across the three individuals. Two of 
these shared positions are focused upon in this chapter. I argue that a 
Grarnscian-like concept of 'catastrophic' equilibrium and a Gramscian-like 
concept of immanence can be found in the thinking of both Sraffa and the later 
Wittgenstein, though much moclified in nature and used for differen t purposes by 
each. 
The organisation of the chapter is as follows. I n the first section 1 describe 
how Gram ci's ideas originated in his thinking about political power and theory 
of the state as a means of maintaining clas hegemony. Then I set for th his ideas 
in connection with the E uropean tradition of critique, in ordet- to explain the 
origins of his two notions of catastrophic eq uilibrium and immanence. In the 
second ection 1 turn to Sraffa to show his attachment to the European tradition 
of critique and also the way in which he draws on these two fundamental 
Gramscian ideas in emphasising monopoly in the market system and the idea of 
what I call 'justified abstraction '. Here the focus i SraiTa's cr itique of Alfred 
Marshall's ideas about equilibrium rather than his later economics. In the third 
section I briefly describe the critical encounter between SraiTa and Wittgenstein. 
Then I discuss Wittgenstein's later ideas to argue that they how a similar attach-
ment to the European tra dition of critique, while making use of notions like 
catastrophic equilibrium and immanence in the explanation of rule-following in 
language-games and the concept of family resemblance. The fo urth and last 
section makes concluding comments about the interaction between continental 
European and British tra ditions of ideas, based on the clisplacem ent of Sraffa 
and Wittgenstein from Europe in the period of war and turmoil at the beginning 
of the twentieth century. H ere I attempt to say a few things about what make for 
'revolutionary' developme nts in ideas. 
Gramsci and the tradition of critique: catastrophic 
equilibriwn and inunanence 
Hegel's contribution to the idea of critique came in the form of his account of 
dialectical development of thought, whereby one form of thought is evaluated 
and taken up in subsequent, more complex forms. Marx made Lhis process 
historical and material, a nd placed classes in conflict and opposition to one 
another in order to demonstrate the working ou t of the process. Gramsci, caught 
up in and leading the political struggles of the working class in I taly at the begin-
ning of the century, brought Marx's thinking to bear on the contest for power. 
Central to this was a changed view of the sta te. The Social Democratic econd 
lnternational had treated such institutions as the Church, the schools and univer-
sities, unions, political parties, the media, e tc. , as repressive apparatuses on 
analogy to coercive state apparatuses such as the police, the cour ts, the prisons, 
the army and the government, but had still defmed the state instrumentally as a 
class dictatorship based on the exercise of brute force. Gramsci, beginning in his 
early Ordine Nuovo period, however, developed a theory of ideological state appa-
ratuses based on his concept of hegem ony. Exercising state pov.,er meant more 
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than just controlling the machinery of government. It also meant organi ing 
class domination through the creation of a world view within 'private', non-state 
institutions. In Lhis latter respect, the dominant class or cia fraction exercises 
hegemony and intellectual and moral leadership (direzione) that complements its 
exercise of brute force. State power, in effect, insinuates itself throughout a 
whole array of non-state social institutions. 
Gramsci's u e of the concept of critique involved an unve iling of hidden 
structures of power. By locatiHg instruments of class dom ina tion within what 
were convemionally regarded as non-state institutions, he ·hawed that these 
institu tions were not benign with respect to class conflict, while at the same time 
exposing their ideological nature. He thu s advanced the understanding of the 
Italian political process by demonstrating a n unappreciated historical role played 
by ideas in that process. This meant that t he idea of the tate operative in the 
European Social Democ1·atic parties of the time needed to be abandoned. T he 
state was not simply an agent or instrument of big monopoly capital. With polit-
ical power operating through a range of non- tate institutions, different ruling 
class factions exercised different types of power in different arenas. Italy was at a 
point. Gramsci believed , at which these different factions were on the verge of 
immobilising each o ther, thus jeopardising the overall class power of the bour-
geoisie, with a severe po litical crisis a possible outcome. ln such circumstances, 
an 'heroic' personality might emerge to create a dictatorship, becau e the forces 
in conflict 'balana each other in a catastrophic manner, that is to say, they balance each 
other in such a way that a continuation of the conOict can only terminate in 
their reciprocal destruction ' (Gramsci, I 97 L: 219; emphasis added). This balance 
was framed as a kind of equilibrium - a cata trophic equilibrium - by Gramsci. 
' In the modern world , the equilibrium with catastrophic prospects occurs . .. 
between forces whose opposition is historically incurable' (Gramsci, 1971: 222). 
Thus Gramsci's critique of conventional notions of the state, bourgeois and 
Social Democratic, generated a new conceptual device to help account for the 
proce s. H ow arc we Lo understand this concept? The idea of a catastrophic 
equilibrium involves a r~jection of the holist idea of society as a unified totality, 
albeit a totality explained in terms of class domination. The holist concept of a 
totality implies both lhat the social whole include· its parts, and that the par ts 
acquire their meaning according to their integration within the whole. But 
Gramsci's view of a catastrophic equilibrium is of an unsustainable juxtaposition 
of oppo ed and discordant forces, the resolution of which in the fo rm-of a new 
class hegemony destroys one side of this opposition, rather than raising it up and 
preserving it in the H egelian sense of Aujhebwzg. The parts of the social whole 
consequently do not acquire their meaning from the whole, hecause they seek to 
be exclusive of one another, re-casting the whole solely in terms of their own 
image. T he idea of a catastrophic equilibrium is thus that of a n unstable, tran-
sient balance in a state of affairs, one in which past and future can be radically 
disjoined in an unpredictable and abrupt manner. In effect, histo ry ratl1er than 
logic explained the evolution of ocieties. 
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Gram ci's critique of the instrumental conception of the form of the state also 
had as an underlying foundation a parallel critique of economi m, the notion that 
there cxi t objective laws of historical dcvelopmem similar to natural laws Lhat 
determine the path and character of political truggle. His ideas had grown out of 
his experience as a leader of the working-class movement in the Turin factory 
councils. Placing imponance on linking theor}' and practice, he under toad Marx 
to be the founder of the philosophy of pra.xis that combined British political 
economy. German ideali t philo ophy and French revolutionary politics. However, 
he believed (Gramsci, 197 1: 388 ff.) that i\Ian{ philo ophy had subsequently been 
mi takenl)' given both an idealist interpretation (in Italy particularly by Croce, 
brieny a Marxist) and a pllllosophical materialist interpretation (by o rthodox 
J\larxi ts Plekhano\· and Bukharin). Both interpretations exhibited a tendency to 
rely on metaphysical rather than hjstoricaJ explanations, which had the effect of 
substituting argumentS between intellectuals and pany member for investigation 
of the historical so·uggle of the working class. He Lhus calJed for recovery of 
Marx's original tripartite nexus, characterising it specifically as immarm1tist in being 
based upon a thoroughly historicised understanding of the concrete and material 
developmem of history: 'The philosophy of praxis continues Lhc philo ophy of 
immanence but purifies it of alJ its metaphysical apparatus and b1·ings it onto the 
concrete terrain of history' (Gramsci, 197 I : 450). 
G r·amsci's immanentist interpretation of the philosophy of praxis alterna-
tively, his rejection of all forms of transcendence is specifically a doctrine 
regarding the interpre tation of generalit or universals in the H egelian tradition. 
Hegel, lollmving Kant's rejection of the idea of bare particulars ('intuitions 
without concepts are blind'), similarly rej ected the idea of an abstract universal 
arguing in favour of concrete universal which require more ' intimate' relation 
with the particulars they involve. Need less to sa y, the ense in which concrete 
universal involve Lheir particulars is philo ophicalJy complex and also subject to 
a range of interpreta tions within the H egelian Lradition. ~loreover, just ho .. ,· 
Gramsci belie,·ed the concept of a concrete universal was to be understood has 
been subject to considerable controversy. oncthele , his rejection of the idea of 
lran. cendence, for example, as expressed in his assertion that 'man is historical 
becoming' ju lilies saying that he rejected the idea of an ab tract universal. h is 
Lh.is development of the European tradition of critique, I sugge t, that mo t 
clearly represents his philosophical side. Together with his characterisation of 
the histo rical process in terms of the idea of catastrophic equilibrium. it repre-
ents two key aspects of his Marxism that can be re-located in modified form in 
' raffa 's early economic thinking. 
Sraffa and critique of neo-classical economics: 
monopoly and justified abstraction 
SraiTa was forced to Oee Italy after ?\ Iussolini came to powec Prior to his arrival 
in Cambridge, he had regular contact wilh Gramsci, and though he was a 
. upporter of the working class, his degrcc of attachment to G t·am sci's particular 
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political posJttons is unclear. Later, however, after Gramsci's imprisonment, 
raffa became important for him as a com act with the outside world. Gramsci 
also drew upon Sraffa 's assistance for books and materials for the writing of what 
subsequently became his Prison XofRhooks. raffa, in turn, maintained his working-
class political allegiance, though his work was almo t exclusively devoted to 
recon truning economic theory. Thi latter began with his critiqu · of key 
assumptions of Ma r haitian nco-classical economic ( rafTa, 1925; 1926; cf. 
~Iane chi, 1986). then continued '"ith his editing of the writings of the cia sica) 
economist David Ricardo, and fi nally culminated in his radjcal reconstruction of 
economic thinking in his book Production qf Commodifies h)1 ,\leans qf Commodities 
(Sraffa, 1960). 
M y focus in this chapter is on rafT a's critical evaluation of Alfred Marshall's 
neo-classical economic ideas as the first clear evidence that a method of 
reasoning encountered through Gramsci was to have a key place in rafTa's 0\\11 
work. h is true that raffa's later Production of CommoditiL.S was more cxplicitJr 
designed as a work of critique, pecifically of neo-classical economic concepts of 
production and capital. But raffa 's known reported impact on \ \ 'ittgcnstein in 
the 1920 (cf. ~ lalcolm, 1958; Roncaglia, 1978; Da..,; , 1988; Andrew , 1996), 
subsequently acknowledged by \ \ 'ittgenstein in the preface to his Philosophical 
lnuesl(l(alions, came before raffa had gone very far in developing his Production of 
Commoditirs thinking. Moreover, though raffa and \\'iugenstein continued to be 
in contact with one a nother in Cambridge after this time, there is little evidence 
that rafT a's subsequent work on Production of Commodities figured in eitJ1er their 
conversations or the development of Wittgenstein's philosophical thinking. 
H ow, then, did ' rafTa develop his critical approach in his papers on ~larshall? 
C entral to this question is SrafT'a's critical treatment of Marshall's under tanding 
of independence between indu tries (cf. Panico and alvadori, 199+; longio,1, 
I 996). ~larshalJ's partial equilibrium method of analysis of' cparatc industry 
upply function makes industries relati,·e ly independent in the sense tl1at a 
change in the quantity of output produced by one indu rry lea,·e the quantitic 
produced by other indu tries unchanged. But this invoked a hort-run analy-;is, 
and chan~es in one indu try' output raised the que tion of whether in the Jon~ 
run there were dimini hing or increasing return to calc: that is. whether 
average co LS of all indu tries ro c or fell with me expan ion of an} one indu!>t~. 
In one respect. suppo ing that tills occurred was compatible "ith ~Jarshall's 
analy is or indu try independence. lf variations in an industry's output operated 
directly only on the co t fu nction of Lhe represemativc firm of that industry, this 
affected the price in that industry, which might sub equentJy affect prices in 
other indu tries, possibly causing further changes in their cost fu nctions. But 
these la tter influences were indirect (in the sense that they were conveyed 
through the change in other industry costs), and were compatible ""ith ~ larshall's 
assumption o r a rela tive independence between indu tries. However, were varia-
tion in a single industry's output to operate directly on the cost fu nction of 
representative firms in a ll indu tries, then the industries were mulUally inter-
dependent, and Marshall's parual equilibrium analysis broke down. 
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Marshall had tried to argue that increasing and diminishing returns were of 
the sort compatible with the first case. In the case of diminishing returns, he 
assumed that an increase in industry output required more intensive use of some 
primary factor of production in scarce supply but only in the expanding industr y. 
Thus there were only indirect and no direct effects on other industries. Sraffa, 
however. argued that it was h ighly unlikely that such primary factors were used 
in just one industry. In the increasing returns case, Marshall had to assume that 
such returns were external to the firm and internal to the industry of which it 
was a part, so that they directly affected the co t fw1ction of the representative 
firm of the industry, but only indirectly affected Lhose of representative fi rms in 
other industries. rafTa noted, however, that M arshall had been fully cognisant of 
tl1e fact that, in tl1e real world, there were increasing returns external to both the 
fJim and the industry. Thus in both cases (diminishing and increasing returns) 
M arshall's analysis could not support his initial conception of tbe relative inde-
pendence of industries. 
To see the significance of these arguments, it is important to recognise that a 
particular concept of economic equilibrium was at the cen tre of the debate. 
Marshall's motivation for treating industries as relatively independent from one 
another had been to provide an account of price on an industry-by-industry 
basis in terms of symmetrically opposed forces of supply and demand. 
Essentially, each industry could be understood solely in terms of its own under-
lying supply and demand conditions, because changes in the supply conditions of 
any one industry had only indirect efrects on the supply conditions of the others. 
But when M arshall' highly restrictive assumptions about the nature of returns 
were ruled out, so that indirect effects of changes in an industry's o utput on the 
cost functions of other industries were replaced by direct effects, then the under-
lying forces determining indu try prices could neither be compartmentalised on 
an industry-by-industry basis, nor were they any longer describable in terms of 
the symmetrically opposed forces of supply and dem and. In effect, the forces 
determining industry prices were communicated through a network of cross-
cutting production relationships between industries rhat transferred the effects of 
changes in cost of production i11 any one industry to the prices of all industries 
{cf. Davis, 1993). 
The idea that supply-and-demand fo rces operated everywhere in essentially 
the san1e way made histor ical development an insignificant factor in explaining 
markets. Indeed, that the same principles al .. vays operated in the sam e manner 
made supply and demand timeless sorts of principles much like Jaws of nature. 
Sraffa rejected this conception of the econom ic world, and believed that laws in 
econorrucs were historically specific. To bring this understanding to bear on neo-
classical economics involved showing that the key concept of equilibrium which 
Marshall employed was not adequate for explaining markets, and in fact was not 
even adequate on its own terms. That is, because it was internally inconsistent, 
Marshall's account could not sustain his view of markets in supply-and-demand, 
partial equilibrium terms. Moreover, the way in which that account broke down 
demonstrated that a more historical understanding of equilibrium forces in 
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markets was needed. For raffa, that more historical under tanding led to a 
conception of capitalist economies as subject to a process of radically discontin-
uous change, in which conditions supporting a temporarily e tlled state of affairs 
also conta ined the seeds of a disruption of that state of affairs. rafTa's conclu-
sion to his 1926 critique of l\farshall was thus tha t the compctiti,·e market 
system, as Mar hall had explained it, ultimately collapsed once a more realistic 
view of increasing returns was incorporated in it. 
H ow, then, do these ideas rela te in particular to Gramsci's concept of catas-
trophic equilibrium and immanence? l suggest tha t . raffa used the for mer in 
connection with his understanding of the development of monopoly in markets, 
and used the Iauer in connection with his understanding of what was involved in 
makingjustifiablc ab tractions in economics. 
The idea that equilibrium is a temporarily sealed tate of a ffa ir that contain 
the seeds of its own breakdown is not unlike Gramsci's usc 9 f the concept of 
catastrophic equilibrium. In his 1920s account, Sraffa a rgues that the develop-
ment of monopoly i~ a Like ly outcome of increasing returns that remain internal 
to the reprc entative firm of an industry. M onopo lies then develop not only at 
the expense of other firms, but also at the expense of the ystcm of balanced 
competition that l\ farshall saw as the cs ential characteristic of the market 
system . Thus the presence of internal increasing returns aero s industries 
signalled an unstable and transient set of circumstances in which market power 
and barriers to entry would ultimately replace a system of free competition. The 
equilibrium Sraffa described as being implicit in M arsha ll 's thinking was conse-
quently catastrophic in Gramsci's sense of the term in tha t it characteri ed 
'forces whose opposition is historically incura ble'. 
Sraffa's critique of Marshall's treatment of variable returns was also accom-
panied by a complaint about his methodology (Davis, 1998). The classical 
economists, raffa noted, had understood diminishing and increasing returns to 
be rooted in dissimilar economic phenomena, and accordingly did not explain 
them at a higher b ·cl of abstraction as instances of one genera l type of prin-
ciple. Mar hall, according!)~ ' found it nece sary to introduce certain 
modification into the form of the tw·o law ' as inherited fro m the cia. sica! 
economists, in order to m erge them into a 'single "law" of nonproponional 
returns' ( raffa, 1926: 53 7). This reflected M ar ha ll 's conviction that ' the essen-
tial cau es determining the price of particular commoditie may be implified 
and grouped together' so as to explain price in market soldy in terms of the 
' forces of demand and supply' (Sraffa, 1926: 535). C learly raffa thought this 
recourse to abstraction and 'essential causes' u~ustificd. Without saying what his 
view of proper abstraction was, we can say tha t, for raffa, '" ha t was objection-
able in Marshall 's methodo logy was its recourse to abstraction understood in 
terms of other abstractions, rather than in terms of the relevant underlying 
concre te phenomena. Sraffa, then, did have an understanding o f justifiable 
abstraction. It probably goes too far to regard tl1is understand ing as invoh·ing a 
commitment to an immanentist idea of a concrete universal, especially since 
SrafTa's ideas a re e laborated in terms of arguments abou t the equilibrium 
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concept in economics rather than in terms of an appraisal of historical forces 
that was Gramsci's concern. Nonetheless, the motivation is similar in each. Both 
tie concepts and generalisation closely to the historical process, and reject the 
idea that concepts and generalisation operate in a timeless, transcendental space. 
Thus it seems fair to say that Sraffa drew on G ramsci's thinking in his own frrst 
significant attempt a t critique in economics. 
Wittgenstein and the critique of meaning: 
rule-following and family resemblance 
The episode in which Sraffa is said to have caused Wittgenstein to doubt his 
early Tract a/us ([192 1] 1961) framework involved a critique of that early frame-
work. Wittgenscein had understood the m eaning of a term to be the object 
which that term names, and had then sought to explain language as a configura-
tion of names that could be mapped outt: in a logical structure of thought. Sraffa, 
howeve1; asked Wittgenstcin to explain to him the logical form of a gesture, 
giving as an ex.ample a famous Italian gesture used to express contempt 
(Malcolm, 1958). A gesture, of course, has its meaning in specific contexts, and 
thus cannot be grasped purely as a piece of language. In posing his question to 
Wittgenstein, then, Sraffa required that Wittgenstein consider how concepts 
function in practical settings. Indeed, the gesture in question could be delivered 
in an obscene manner. T hus Sraffa also unveiled meaning hidden fi·om ordinary 
view, since one had to understand context to know whether a gesture had this 
adclitional dimension. 
When Wittgenstein abandoned his Tractatus picture theory of meaning, he 
recognised that representation is only one of the uses to which language is put. 
Thus understanding how language is used in particular practices in people's 
everyday experience is as important as understanding its representational features. 
'Look at the sentence as an instrument, and at its sense as its employment,' 
Wittgenstein said ( 1958: §42 1 ). This was famously e..'<plained in terms of the idea 
of a 'language-game', or the idea that language is used in localised cmmections to 
accomplish particular kinds of things. A language-game, moreoveJ~ is linked to 
the notion of a 'form of life'. ' [T]hc term "language-game" is meant to bring into 
prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a 
form of lilc' (ibid.: §23). Both of these no tions, it seems fair to say, reflect a kind of 
crilique not unlike that which we see in Gramsci and Sraffa. In the fu·st place, 
understanding concepts and ideas depends on placing them in their p ractical 
context. Second, doing so often reveals features of those concepts and ideas that 
arc otherwise not obvious. In effect, in his later philosophy, Wittgenstein prob-
lcm atises the whole notion of 'language itself' as an object of study. 
How, then, ought one to understand a language-game? Central to 
Wittgenstein's answer is his treatment of how to follow the rules of a game. 
Following a rule competently depends upon seeing how that rule functions in its 
language-game, within the form of life in which it is embedded. T his is funda-
mentally a jJractical rather than an intellectual (interpretive) task: 'any interpretation 
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sLill hangs in the air along with what it interprets, and cannot give it any upport. 
Interpretation by themselves do not determine meaning' (ibid.: § 198). In effect , 
then , obeying a rule entails commitment ro a set of practices and, \\'ittgenstein 
emphasi es. ultimately has to be done 'blindly' (ibid.: §2 19). Indeed, to only ' think 
one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule' (ibid.: 202). This presents a far 
differem pictu re of rules and rule-following from that found in a purely 
language-oriemcd point of view. When ruJes and rule-follo .. ving are a pan of a 
set o f activities a nd enure forms of life, they arc imerwoven with other ru les and 
practices rather tha n being discrete emiLies. This further complicates the mean-
ings we gin' to words which become in fact 'a complicated network of 
similarities overlapping and criss-crossing ' that at most have a ' family resem-
blance' to one another (ibid.: §66). 
How do these ideas relate LO those advanced for Gramsci a nd raffa above? 
My argument is that the chief points of contact between these ideas of 
Wiugcn tein and Lho e of Gramsci and raffa arise from the former's emphasis 
on rule-following and fa mily re emblan ce. RuJc-following relate to the emphasis 
Gram sci and ra!Ta place on equilibria (or settled state of affairs of any son ) as 
being transitory and temporary: Family re emblance relate to their under-
standing of reasonable abstraction and generalisation. 
The idea that equilibrium might be catastrophic may seem foreign to 
\Vittgcnstcin' la ter ideas. But a less dramaLic render ing of the term 'catas-
trophic' as un table and changeable can be argued to capture an important 
dimension of Wittgenstein's understanding of what is involved in following rules 
in a language-game. Following a rule is no t a matter of associating the past uses 
of a term with their occasions of use, a nd then inductively applying that term in 
like circumstances in the future. Following a rule presupposes a commiLment to 
participate in the form of life in \vhich that language-game is played. , uch 
commitment on the part of many indi\'iduals establishes a framework in which 
meanings may evolve, as when individuals apply and accept the usc of a term in 
new contexts. Consequently, if we see Language-games as having equilibrium-like 
properties, in the ense thar a collection of meanings within a language-game at 
any one time possess a set of relatively idemifiable relationships towards one 
another, then because these relarionships may be transformed and reconfigured 
as the language-game is played, tl1ese equilibrium relation hips may also become 
' unstable' and 'changeable' . 
Wittgenstein's idea of the meaning of a concept as a family resemblance 
suggests much the arne idea, though in a more static sense. Putting aside change 
in meaning, a concept al any one tin1e consritute a combination of a pplications 
and senses that stand in uncertain relaLion to one ano ther, since no central or 
essential sense unites all the ways in v\'hich the concept may be used. Thus, the 
fam ily resemblance notion suggests that concepts are like equilibria that contain 
discordant clements a notion not far removed from Gramsci's catastrophic 
equilibrium idea. 
Wittgcnstein's i nvestigations philosophy is often seen as a rejection of meta-
physics and of the forms of ab traction on which metaphysics depends. But this 
140 John B. DlWis 
hardly implies that he rej ected the very idea of generaJity itself Rather, for 
Wittgenstein, generality is a product of family resemblance - the generaJity of a 
concep t is produced out of the myriad overlapping and criss-crossing senses in 
which that concept is used. This means, however, that since there is no single -
therefore essentiaJ - meaning shared by all of the ways in which an expression is 
used, we accordingly have no way of specifying concepts apart from dcsctibing 
their actual uses and conditions of application . Indeed, it seems for Wirtgenstein 
tha t the entire business of investigating abstract concepts is suspect. Thus while it 
may be awh.'ward to use the idea of a concre te universaJ in connection with 
Wittgenstein's later views, nonetheless his image of a concept as being consti-
tuted out of a famiJy resemblance effectively embeds particularity of use in the 
very idea of generaJi ty. 
In offering these remarks about rule-followin g and famiJy re ·emblance here, I 
do not wish to enter into the voluminous debates between philosophers over the 
meaning and significance of WJttgenstein's la ter philosophy. Rather, the purpose 
here is to attempt to show how Wittgenstein's la ter mientation may have connec-
tions to a criticaJ tradition of ideas that was introduced into Cambridge by 
Sraffa. What seems interesting in this attempt is that it makes a case for a 
Marxist influence, aJbei t translated and indirect , on the later Wittgenstein. The 
strength of this case, however, depends in p art on seeing different traditions of 
ideas as coming into contact. Prior to his re turn to Cambridge in the ] 920s 
Wittgenstein was entirely at home in the early analytic, logical a tomist philos-
ophy of Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore. But then he came into contact with 
raffa, to whom he records, in the preface to Philosophical Investigations, his indebt-
edness 'for the most consequential ideas of this book' (1958: x). I dose, then, by 
looking very briefly a t the issue of interacting traditions of ideas. 
Interaction of European and British ideas: 
the displacement of Sraffa and Wittgenstein 
M y argument in this chapter is that a European tradition of ideas deriving origi-
nally from H egel playecl t1 role in the la ter development of AngJophone 
philosophy of language, and specificaJJy had an impact on the la ter thinking of 
\Vittgenstein by way of Sraifa. 1\[oreover, the particular interpre tation of Hegel's 
thinking involved came by way of Marxism, as formulated by Gramsci in his 
philosophy of pra:<.is. The argument that Sra fTa was the key intermediary may 
seem odd on the surface, since Wittgenstein was Austrian and should have been 
no less aware of the critical tradition in European thinking than Sraffa. Were this 
true, there would not have been a role for Sraffa in influencing Wittgcnstein's 
later ideas. But as is well known, Wittgenstein was not well acquainted with or 
interested in the H egelian tradition. Also, although he had an interest at one 
point in sociaJism (and visited Russia in the hope of seeing socialism in practice), 
he had very little apprecia tion for Marxism either as a body of ideas or as a 
political programme. Accordingly, his early work is enti rely consonant with work 
already carried on in Cambridge by Russell , Moore and other s. ralTa's subse-
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qucn t comact with Wiugenstein can according ly be een as a vehicle for bringing 
the European critical tradition- or at least its thrust to his a ttention. 
\Viugen tein's later work is often regarded as revolutionary. It i re,·olutionary 
in tha t it not only challenged his mm (and Rus ell 's and ~Ioorc' early ideas), but 
in tha t it brought into que tion the entire approach LO philosophy of language 
dominam in Britain a t the time. Wittgenstein's earlier Traclalus, while a remark-
able contributiou, was n o t revolutionary in the way in which the later 
lnvestiKatiom was. Why, t.hen , did Wittgenstein become ' revolutio nary' in his Later 
work? This long-debated and perhaps unanswerable questio n has usuaLly been 
examined in terms of Wittgenstein's genius as a philosopher a nd his personal 
intell ctual development, and has been littJc investigated in terms of Sraffa's 
possible inllucncc on Wittgenstein. But th is seems to presuppose tha t develop-
ments wit.hin philosophy derive entirely from thr nature o f ideas 'vvithin 
philosophy. It i reasonable to think, o f cour e, that ideas from economics or 
even politic would not be inlluentiaJ in changing ideas in philosophy. No doubt 
this has lr d orne to disregard ra1Ja's known influence on \\'ittgcnstein. But the 
argum nt here is that it was Sraffa 's philo ophical virws no t hi economic -
tha t in fluencrd \Viugcnstein. Sra1Ja presumably nc, ·cr explained ~larshalJ ' 
pa rtia l equilibrium analysis to \\'ingenstein. R a ther, he applied the sort of philo-
sophical critique he had ad,·anced against ~larshall to \Vittgen tein' early 
a umption . 
H owever, 1 am not a ttempting here to explain the revolu tionary nature of 
Wittgenstein's late r philosophy in terms of rafTa's personal influence. I am 
sugge ting, rather; tha t individuals are bearers of imcllectualtraditio ns, and that 
it is the ir contact with o ne a nother as such bearers tha t proclucrs revolutionary 
changes in ideas. Thus Sraffa's displacement from Italy to Brita in by the rise of 
Mussolini brought two histories of ideas into proximity with o ne another that 
had previously been la rgely separate. But there is a special dimension to this 
particular occasion of contact. When such con tacts occur, more often than not, 
communication between indi,i duals is not succe sful, because their different 
paradigm atic orienta tions invol\'e such different structure a nd organisation of 
idea as to effectively preclude it. Certainly . rafTa was not the only individual 
wo rking in Brita in whose inteUectuaJ antecedents were not fam ilia r or at home 
there. ?\or wa · he the only uch individual \\~th "hom \\'ittgcnstein came into 
contact. But his pa rt icular inheritance- the critical tradition - o ffered a means 
of engagemem with British inteUectuaJ work which other non- Briti h lraditions 
may not have po. ses eel. That is, by shm,~ng comradictions in ~ [arshaU ' neo-
classical system that derived from its critiq ue as a system of ideas functioning 
within an historical fram ework, Sraffa was able to make relevant his ovm 
thinking about the ma rket economy. Sra ffa' ideas were revolutionary in 
economics, then, specifically because they were from the Euro pean critical 
tradition that often opera ted by revealing a hidden 'histo ricist' dimension to 
system s of ideas which claimed to be timeless and universal in their a bstraction. 
And such revelation could be the w1doing preci ely of their claims LO univer-
salily. 
142 John B. Dm1is 
\1\'ingcnstcin arguably took up his revolutionary ma ntle from Sralf<t thro ugh 
this particular intermediation. By exposing his own earlier ideas to critical exam-
ination, he demonstra ted the place and prio ri ty of his la ter framework. Again. 
this is fa r from saying tha t the content of . raffa' thinking <tbout economics is 
what is revolutionary in the la ter Wittgenste in. Rather, it is to sa r tha t 
Witlgenstcin'~ la ter philosophical ide<ts were revolutionary because they presup-
posed the same philosophical posture of critiq ue tha t • raffa' (and Gramsci ' ) 
approachc posses cd . In the British thinking o f the first ha ll' of the twentieth 
century. ·which la rgely lacked a way of re flexively ceing ideas functionin~ within 
historical and social contexts. bringing this way of thinking to meaning and 
language was indeed re\'Olutionary. Thus it seems that revolutionary hifts in 
idras may not be so much a matter of \vha t individuals reason a nd argue 
{though th is is nm to deny , ra ffa a nd \\'ittgen. tein's rcsp 'ctive remarkable intel-
lectual abilities). Rather, uch shifts seem to come about because of 
confrontation between entire traditions or ideas. o me uch confronta tions, 
olwiouo;ly, are more producti,·e than others. In thr instance examined here, a 
particula rly productive confrontation in traditio n of ideas has been a rgued to 
have involved the reformulation and re-application o f idea<; central lo the 
l\ larxist tradition to twentieth-century philosophy of language in Brita in.1 
Note 
I am indebted to G avin KiLching a nd 1'\igel Pleasant:. for helpful comments on earlier 
vcr:.ions of this chapler. 
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